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COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The stat-eni<jn!- oi f H»M IS in Brown's appeal brief is not 
entirely accurate. It merits these brief comments: 
(i) B rown contends (i t s h r i e l"; a t 3 ) 11 I a bo t ed 
for six years to gain the specification of Games' 
equipment for the Church Office Building Brown did 
work towards qnuunq i I»H speriLlo "
 t ;.. but not for 
six years. Its efforts started in 19 63 and extended 
1
 The abbreviations first used in Carnes* principal brief 
are used here, too: the record on appeal, as paginated by the 
court clerk, is designated "RM; the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, entered by The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on 
December 17, 1985, are designated "Findings"; the transcript of 
the trial is designated "Tr."; the parties' trial exhibits are 
designated "Tr. Ex."; and the Deposition of Daniel Neviaser, 
dated February 16, 1983, is designated "Neviaser Depo." 
All trial exhibits mentioned in this brief were included in 
the Addendum of Carnes* principal brief. 
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to the early fall of 1965. (Tr. 17.) The project 
then sat dormant for nearly three years. There is no 
evidence in the trial record that Brown made any 
further efforts on the project between the onset of 
dormancy and its termination in August, 1968. In 
fact, when the project was reactivated in February, 
1969, it was the Johnston Company, Carnes* new sales 
representative in Albuquerque, who undertook the 
work. (PI. Tr. Ex. 101.) 
(ii) Brown contends (its brief at 3) it was 
terminated in 1968 " . . . shortly before Carnes1 
equipment was specified in the plans for the 
project." There is no evidence in the trial record 
which indicates when the equipment was specified (or, 
when the Church paid for it or when Carnes paid 
commissions to Long-Deming and to the Johnston 
Company). This much is known, however. The March, 
1969 deadline (of the five month extension period in 
which Brown could still earn commissions) passed 
without an order for Carnes1 equipment. Sometime 
afterwards, but not disclosed in the trial record, 
Carnes* equipment was specified for the Office 
Building and the construction contract was awarded. 
(iii) Brown contends (its brief at 3) its fear of 
losing part of its commission on the project was 
-2-
fueled by several considerate •*• . Perh.ips. But a 
.oret 'il review of the correspondence between Carnes 
and Brown indicates Brown's only real fear was the 
potential ^ . . * <iu -^ <->-if icat »n commission with 
others on the job, Bridgers & Paxton Consulting 
Engineers, Inc., the project's associate mechanical 
engI net - \ uis 1 ucd Led 1n Albuquerque. If Bridgers & 
Paxton formally specified Carnes* equipment. \ne New 
Mexico sales repress v «*-i : oyd 
Engineering, =^ .? idi«:i- the Johnston Company) 
automatically earned under the sales agreemen ..* 
portion of. the commission for the specification 
credit, It was i hi s concern, and -:ot others, which 
monopolized Brown's attention. (See t.^ , PI. Tr. 
Exs •-. 104; Neviaser Depo, at 11-14.) 
(iv) Brown contends (its briep~ at ^s Carnes1 
national sales manager, Daniel rw\ a?*-. committed in 
writing to pay Brown, the specification credit, the 
approval credit, and the territory credit for the 
project "when i I was I inihinnl i io matter when that 
time was," Not i. iae. Neviaser1 s letter did not 
guarantee the payment of credits forever. (PI. Tr. 
. . 2 
Ex. 106,) : • -."laser testified he had no 
1
 Mr. Neviaser was deposed in Wisconsin in 1983. His 
deposition was received into evidence and portions were read 
into the record at trial. (Tr. 32.) The relevant pages of his 
deposition transcript include 14-18. (R. 816.) 
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intention to guarantee unconditionally any commission 
to Brown. To receive a commission of any kind, Brown 
was required to be a sales representative when the 
commission was payable. If Brown were not, it was not 
entitled to a commission under the sales agreement. 
(v) Under the parties* sales agreement, a 
terminated sales representative earned a commission 
for an order of Carnes' equipment which was placed 
during the thirty day period following termination. 
(PI. Tr. Ex. 109, 1f 14.) Brown contends (its brief at 
4) it was customary for Carnes to enhance the 
representative's opportunity for a commission by 
extending the thirty day period. That is true. 
(Neviaser Depo. at 16-17.) In fact, Carnes did 
precisely that in this case. Brown was terminated in 
August, 1968. (PI. Tr. Ex. 107.) The normal thirty 
day period expired in late September. Brown requested 
an extension (believing the construction contracts 
were to be bid in January, 1969), and Carnes extended 
the period to March, 1969 — five additional months. 
(PI. Tr. Exs. 108, 103.) 
(vi) Brown assumes throughout its brief that it 
alone was responsible for the incorporation of Carnes' 
equipment in the Office Building. Neither the court's 
findings nor the evidence at trial support the 
assumption. At the time Brown was terminated, Carnes' 
equipment had not been specified, ordered, or 
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installed. Clearly, Long-Deming and the Johnston 
Company contributed to the effort. There is nothing 
in the record to the contrary. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court determined Carnes owed a 4% commission 
(for specification credit) to Brown. The award was not based 
on the clear language of the sales agreement between the 
parties. Rather, the court based it on what it perceived as 
the implied duty of good faith Carnes owed to Brown, which 
Carnes had breached by not guaranteeing the commission to Brown 
before Carnes employed Long-Deming. Carnes acknowledges the 
existence of an implied duty of good faith in all contracts, 
but contends the trial court misapplied the doctrine in this 
case. In effect, the trial court rewrote the sales agreement 
(although it specifically found it to be unambiguous) in order 
to afford Brown equitable relief. 
Having determined Carnes owed a commission, the court 
calculated its amount. That calculation was improperly based 
(i) on dollar amounts alleged in the amended complaint filed by 
Brown and (ii) on answers to interrogatories filed by 
Long-Deming, Carnes* co-defendant. No competent evidence was 
produced at trial on the issue of damages. 
Brown cross-appealed for a 10% commission and for 
prejudgment interest calculated from 1972, rather than the 1978 
date chosen by the trial court. Brown is entitled to neither. 
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CROSS APPEAL 
1. BROWN IS NOT ENTITLED TO 10% COMMISSIONS. 
The trial court held Brown was entitled to a 
commission. It awarded Brown 4% ($20,000) of the net cost of 
the Carnes* equipment installed in the Church Office Building 
(calculated by the court to be $500,000). Brown has appealed, 
contending it is entitled to 10% of the net amount. 
Carnes denies it owes any commission to Brown. If a 
commission is awarded, however, it must be measured at 4%. 
A. The Sales Agreement Was Not Amended to Guarantee Brown A 
10% Commission. 
Brown worked with the architects and engineers to have 
Carnes1 equipment specified in the construction plans for the 
Office Building and ultimately installed in the structure. 
Eventually, it became concerned that the active involvement of 
Bridgers & Paxton on the project threatened its commission for 
specification credit: if Bridgers & Paxton, the project's 
mechanical engineer located in Albuquerque, formally specified 
Carnes1 equipment, the New Mexico sales representative of 
Carnes automatically earned a portion of the commission for the 
specification credit. On June 2, 1965, Brown wrote Neviaser 
about the matter: 
The samples that were charged partially to us for 
the 
L.D.S. CHURCH OFFICE BLDG. 
job were used to seek specification for Carnes 
products for that job. Having done as much as we have 
with Bridgers & Paxton, and with the architect, who is 
located in Salt Lake, and who is really the ultimate 
specifying agent, we are reluctant to accept the idea 
that a specification split with the representative in 
Albuquerque [then Boyd Engineering] should be made at 
the time of sale. 
We would like to have a letter from you in our 
file confirming our idea that we should get 
specification credit as well as territory and order 
credit for the L.D.S. Church Office Building when it 
is finalized. The fact that Bridgers & Paxton has 
their home office in Albuquerque does not seem to 
justify a split on specification with the Albuquerque 
representative for this job. 
(PI. Tr. Ex. 110.) Brown's letter was answered twicee First/ 
on June 13/ 1965/ by Kenneth H. Watts, then western regional 
sales manager for Carnes: 
Your June 2 letter directed to Dan Neviaser was 
forwarded to me. 
I am the first one to realize the tremendous amount of 
work and time you have spent on the subject job. I 
would also like to point out that a great deal of 
effort has been done with the firm of Bridgers & 
Paxton in the past three to four years by our 
Albuquerque representative, Boyd Engineering/ and the 
Carnes Corporation. 
I feel that if we did not have a good relationship 
with Bridgers & Paxton in Albuquerque# it would have 
been much more difficult to secure a good 
specification on the subject job. You are probably 
not aware of the day by day calls the local 
representative receives for various questions during 
the design of a project. Many times these questions 
are not important enough to send you copies of 
correspondence. 
In Dan Neviaser's October 6 letter to Mr, Bill 
Blackwell of Boyd Engineering, Albuquerque, he 
indicated that the specification credit should be 
split between Albuquerque and your office. You 
indicated you participated financially for some 
samples for the subject job. Boyd Engineering has 
also participated financially in two trips of Bridgers 
& Paxton personnel to our plant in Verona. Personally 
I would like to see you get 100% credit but I think, 
under the circumstances, it is only fair to split the 
commission with Boyd Engineering. After all, the 
situation could be reversed at some time. 
-7-
(PI. Tr. Ex. 95.) Two days later, on June 15th, Neviaser also 
responded: 
This is to state that you are to receive specification 
credit as well as territory and order credit for the 
Latter-Day Saints Church Office Building when it is 
finished. 
There is no question in our mind that the 
specification orginated in Salt Lake City, and 
although Bridgers & Paxton have their home office in 
Albuquerque, all of the activity that they have been 
involved in has been in your area. 
You certainly deserve this order in its entirety. 
(PI. Tr. Ex. 106.) 
3 
Brown's theory (now and at trial ) is that the sales 
agreement had been amended by the exchange of letters between 
Brown and Neviaser. The theory has no basis in fact or law. 
The trial court rejected it, and for good reasons. 
First, the parties did not intend to amend the sales 
agreement. Their discussions dealt exclusively with the 
potential split of specification commission between Brown and 
the New Mexico sales representative. Consider the following: 
The sales agreement required the specification 
commission to be split. Neviaser believed, however, the 
specification efforts to date (June, 1965) had originated more 
in Salt Lake City than in Albuquerque. (Neviaser Depo. at 
13.) So, in an effort to avoid a potential quarrel between 
sales representatives (Neviaser Depo. at 18), he made an 
3
 See Tr. 72-73, 99-102, 131-134. 
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exception to the general rule and expressed Carnes* willingness 
to award the specification commission to Brown: 
[My letter of June 15, 1965] is simply a determination 
by the factory, by the manufacturer that there 
deserves to be special consideration for specification 
credit in this specific case, in that the 
specification credit should not be divided between two 
different locations. 
(Neviaser Depo. at 15.) Asked whether he intended the letter 
to guarantee unconditionally Brown's receipt of all three 
commissions even after Brown's termination, Neviaser responded: 
. • • [I]t goes with the contract because when I refer 
to territory and order credit, it implies that [Brown] 
will be selling the product, the project himself and 
that he was—would still be the sales representative 
in order to make that sale. 
Absolutely not because it also doesn't guarantee 
[Brown] would get order credit, unless [Brown] gets 
the orderc 
The letter is obviously amended to the terms of 
the existing agreement, goes with that agreement, runs 
with that agreement. 
If the sales agreement is terminated, I would say 
that this [the letter] is terminated. 
(Neviaser Depo. at 14-15, 16.) 
The sales agreement automatically gave commissions to 
any terminated sales representative whose active price 
quotations yielded equipment orders within the thirty day 
period following termination. (PI. Tr. Ex. 109, If 14.) It was 
not unusual for Carnes, said Neviaser, to extend on occasion 
the thirty day period up to six months, precisely what Carnes 
did here. (Neviaser Depo. at 17.) Any such extension was 
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determined at the time of termination. The expiration of the 
extension was absolute, however: 
. . . I have never heard of a circumstance where the 
previous agent got a commission for the order beyond 
the time that was agreed upon, at the time of 
termination. 
(Neviaser Depo. at 18.) 
Second, the purported amendment was valid and 
enforceable only if Brown and Carnes exchanged sufficient 
consideration — new mutual promises in which each party 
pledged to give up something to the benefit of the other.4 The 
existence of consideration is determined by examining whether 
the person against whom a promise is to be enforced, the 
promisor (Carnes), contemporaneously received something in 
return from the person to whom he made the promise, the 
promisee (Brown). Here, that is a simple enough question. 
Carnes did not receive any new consideration from Brown: any 
promise by Brown (and there was none) was only to do what it 
already had a "preexisting legal duty" to do; or, the legal 
4
 There are exceptions to the rule that only promises 
supported by consideration are enforceable. The doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is such an exception. It requires that 
certain elements exist: (1) an existing promise; (2) made with 
the expectation it will induce another party to rely upon it; 
(3) justifiably relied upon substantially; (4) to the injury of 
the promissee should the promise not be enforced. See Union 
Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 
(1964); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979). The 
doctrine does not apply here. Brown did not rely to its 
detriment on Carnes' purported promise. All of Brown's efforts 
prior to the June letters were expended pursuant to the 
original sales agreement. And, there is no evidence that Brown 
relied on the alleged promise and substantially altered its 
position after June, primarily because the project was at a 
standstill from 1965 until 1968 and because Brown was 
terminated in 1968. See Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 
1974) . 
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value already given by Brown to support the original sales 
agreement was "past consideration" and could not have been used 
again or brough forward to support the amendment; or, the 
consideration was not an "accord and satisfaction" because the 
doctrine does not apply if the debtor (Carnes) presumably has 
(and that was Brown's argument in its June 2d letter) a prior 
legal obligation to perform under the contract* See, e.g., 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1977); Baggs v. Anderson 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 25 Utah 2d 244, 480 P.2d 131 (1971); 1A 
A.Lo Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 210-239 (1963). 
Brown (its brief at 9-10) side-steps completely the 
issue of consideration. It claims only that parties can modify 
their contract, although the modification may conflict with the 
original terms, so long as their minds met on the changes; and 
that relinquishment of a contract right, as in dispute 
resolutions, is sufficient consideration for a promise. Carnes 
agrees with both principles, but they do not solve the issue 
here. Contracting parties still must exchange some measure of 
consideration to support their modifications. Where is it in 
this case? Brown did not relinquish anything. 
B. Brown Did Not Earn Approval or Territorial Commissions. 
Brown contends the court granted it the commission for 
specification credit which had been paid by Carnes to 
Long-Deming, but neglected to include in its award the 
additional commission which had been paid to Long-Deming for 
-11-
approval and territorial credit. The same evidence which led 
the court to conclude Carnes must pay Brown for the 
specification credit, Brown says, should have led the court to 
award it the approval and territorial credits, too. 
Brown apparently does not understand the court's 
decision. The court found Brown had performed substantially 
all of the specification work on the project and, therefore, 
was entitled to a specification commission. (Tr. 159, 160.) 
The specification commission had in fact been paid to 
Long-Deming and had been split (80-20) between Long-Deming and 
the Johnston Company, then Carnes1 New Mexico representative, 
in recognition of the latter1s efforts in assisting Bridgers & 
Paxton. The court found the commission split was both 
appropriate and reasonable. (Tr. 159, 160, 170.) So, when the 
court awarded a specification commission to Brown, the 
commission was calculated precisely as Long-Deming•s had been: 
80% of 5%, or net 4%.5 
5 The sales agreement offered two similar but slightly 
different approaches for the calculation of commissions. (PI. 
Tr. Ex. 109, Addendum No. 3, If 4.) If equipment were purchased 
directly by a customer, one method was used; if it were sold 
intead to a Carnes distributor, another method was used. Given 
the facts of the case, the trial court selected the first 
approach. (Tr. 167.) Consequently, comissions were calculated 
in this manner: 
1, Specification credit - 5% of the net amount of 
the invoice, or 40% of the net commission, 
whichever is less. 
2. Approval credit - 2 1/2% of the net amount of the 
invoice, or 20% of the net commission, whichever 
is less. 
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Long-Deming had been paid full approval and 
territorial commissions, too. These the trial court 
intentionally declined to award to Brown. When the 
construction contracts actually were finalized, and the 
equipment ordered and installed, Long-Deming was representing 
Carnes and handling all of the problems associated with the 
construction. The court described the situation in this 
manner: 
The Court certainly recognizes that Long Deming 
was on board when the contract was signed up, or the 
sale was ultimately made, and that Long Deming was in 
place when the problems arose, and it had obligations 
to service and so forth. And that within that 
context, [Carnes] was in a position to see that part 
of the commission went to Long-Deming for services 
which it might ultimately render. . . . 
[After Brown's termination] it was generally past 
history in terms of the specification workup process, 
and the thing left to be concluded . . . was the final 
solicitation of the sale, the servicing of the sale 
after it was in place, and the ultimate tying down of 
the signoff on specifications, the bid process, and 
ultimate acceptance of the bid. And as to those 
responsibilities it appeared to the Court that both 
(Footnote 5 continued from previous page) 
3. Territorial credit - 2 1/2% of the net amount of 
the invoice, or 20% of the net commission, 
whichever is less. 
There was no evidence presented at trial about the actual 
dollar amounts of commissions paid by Carnes to Long-Deming and 
to the Johnston Company. Thus, the court focused on the net 
cost of the Carnes* equipment installed in the Office Building 
and the corresponding percentages described above (5% and 
2 1/2 % and 2 1/2%). 
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the representative in New Mexico and Long Deming, the 
successor representative, were the only people present 
to perform those services, which they did, 
(Tr. 161, 169-170.) Long-Deming, not Brown, had earned the 
approval and territorial commissions, 
2. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED. IF IT IS 
ALLOWED, IT MUST BE CALCULATED FROM 1978, NOT 1972. 
The trial court awarded Brown prejudgment interest of 
6% per year, calculated from January 1, 1978 to the date of the 
judgment (December 17, 1985). Brown contends the interest 
should be calculated from January, 1972, instead. Brown is 
wrong. No prejudgment interest should be awarded. If it is 
allowed, however, the interest must be calculated from 1978, 
not from 1972. 
The trial court first broached the subject of 
prejudgment interest at the close of trial: 
I can find no evidence, other than the statement 
of [Allen Tibbals, Brown's prior] counsel, and that's 
about the best I have to go on in terms of ultimate 
payment. But again, the only reference I found were 
statements made by Mr. Tibbals about the building 
being dedicated in 1972, as I recall. And he, I 
think, made reference that final payments, or some 
final payments had not been made as late as 1977, 
6
 In 1981 the Utah Legislature amended § 15-1-1 Utah Code 
Ann. (1986) and increased the interest rate from 6% to 10%. 
The amendment specifically excluded contracts made before May 
14, 1981, however. Those contracts still earn the 6% rate 
authorized by prior law. The sales agreement between Carnes 
and Brown was executed on May 24, 1961. (PI. Tr. Ex. 109.) It 
may earn only 6%. 
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because of the problems. There is nothing stronger 
than that in the record, and that is the 
representation of counsel that stands in the published 
deposition [of Ted R. Brown], unrefuted. I can do no 
better in terms of time frame, that I can find, on 
that. 
The case is old; things are stale. And I'm not 
laying blame on you for that, but I think history 
could have been tracked a little better in terms of 
the underlying damage issue. 
The Court concludes and finds that . . . interest 
ought to be allowed [on the judgment] at the legal 
rate, which is 6% per annum, from January 1, 1978, 
until the date of judgment . . . 
MR. HOWELL: Excuse me, your Honor. Did you say 
that interest was to run from January, 1978? 
THE COURT: January 1, 1978. 
MR. HOWELL: Not 19 68? 
THE COURT: The best statement at all that I an 
[sic] find anywhere is simply the unchallenged 
statement of Allen Tibbals that some of the payments 
were still outstanding in 1977. If there is something 
that I've missed in the record that supports something 
other than that, I guess I would rely on it. At this 
point I know of nothing. 
(Tr<, 165-168.) The award was included in the Findings of Fact 
7 
and Conclusions of Law entered by the court. 
Under the sales agreement, commissions were to be paid 
by Carnes to its sales representatives when Carnes received 
7
 See Findings at 8, 1f 46; at 10, 1f 7. 
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full payment for its equipment. (PI. Tr. Ex. 109, Addendum No. 
3, If 4 and 1f 5.) Brown admits (its brief at 15) Allen Tibbals 
believed final payment was made by the Church to Carnes as late 
as 1977 and it admits the trial court did not find any 
evidence, aside from Allen Tibbal's comments, upon which to 
determine (i) the date Carnes was paid by the Church and (ii) 
the date Carnes, in turn, paid commissions to its sales 
representatives. Brown contends, however, there is additional 
evidence in the record which proves the commissions actually 
were paid by Carnes to Long-Deming in 1972. Thus, Brown 
concludes, prejudgment interest should have been calculated 
from January, 1972, not 1978. Brown's argument simply is not 
correct. 
The additional evidence which Brown now touts does not 
appear in the trial record. It is material produced in 
pre-trial discovery, but never offered and received in evidence 
at trial. For example, Brown first refers to the pre-trial 
Q 
deposition of its president, Ted R. Brown, for proof that the 
9 Church Office Building was dedicated in 1972. Quite apart 
from any debate over the merits of Mr. Brown's deposition 
8
 See Deposition of Ted R. Brown, dated November 23, 
1981. (R. 814.) 
9
 The date of the building's dedication is irrelevant. 
The issue, rather, is the specific date commissions were 
payable by Carnes to its sales representatives. That date 
might be identified as the date the Church paid Carnes or as 
the date Carnes actually paid Long-Deming and the Johnston 
Company. 
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testimony, the deposition transcript itself was not trial 
evidence* The transcript was merely "published" at trial so 
Games' counsel could use it to impeach Mr. Brown's testimony 
during cross-examination. (Tr. 78.) The deposition was not 
received into evidence, and for good reason: Mr. Brown was 
present in court to testify personally. See Utah R. Evid. 801, 
804. Notice, in addition, that when it refers to the 
deposition, Brown focuses on the remarks of its counsel, Allen 
Tibbals, on the testimony of the deponent. Similar to the 
trial court, Brown is willing to try the case using its counsel 
as a witness. 
Brown also refers to some interrogatory answers filed 
by Long-Deming. See Answer of Defendant Lonq-Deminq-Utah, Inc. 
to Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories, dated January 6, 
1983c (R. 479-485). An attachment to the answers, contends 
Brown, proves that the Church paid Carnes and that Carnes paid 
1 0
 In his deposition, Ted R. Brown was asked when the 
Church paid for the Carnes equipment. Mr. Brown said he 
thought payment was tendered in 1972. Allen Tibbals, Brown's 
lawyer, disagreed with his client: 
MR. TIBBALS: No. I'll have to interrupt on that. 
A lot of it hadn't been paid for yet in 1972 when 
I was—brought these people in, because they got into 
a great big hassle between the Church and Carnes. 
Some of the equipment wouldn't work, so the Church 
refused to pay for it. 
There was going to be a suit brought, but then 
Carnes sent some people out here, and Carnes decided 
that they'd make an adjustment. Now, what the nature 
of the adjustment was was never disclosed. But as 
late as 1977 some of the equipment hadn't been paid 
for by the church. 
Brown Depo. at 51. 
Long-Deming, both before January, 1972, Actually, the 
attachment proves nothing of the kind. Many dates of payment 
are missing, and some reflect payment in 1973; moreover, it is 
not known whether the attachment includes all of the equipment 
installed in the Office Building. The most telling comment 
about the use of the attachment, however, is this: it was 
never offered and received into evidence at trial. If the 
attachment is so important, why was it not used at trial? It 
certainly may not be used in this appeal. 
The deposition testimony and the interrogatory 
attachment may not be used by Brown to enlarge the period for 
prejudgment interest. They do serve to make a point, however. 
Prejudgment interest is awarded only when the loss can be fixed 
as of a particular time. See, e.g., Anderson v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978). The loss 
cannot be fixed to a specific date in this case. There is no 
evidence in the trial record to indicate when the Church paid 
Carnes or to indicate when Carnes paid commissions to 
Long-Deming and to the Johnston Company. No evidence 
whatsoever. Brown failed to carry its burden of proof on the 
issue. The trial court improperly attempted to overcome the 
absence of such evidence by relying on the statements of 
Brown's counsel for proof. It cannot be done. Lawsuits turn 
on the testimony of the parties, not their legal counsel's. 
Prejudgment interest should be disallowed altogether. 
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APPEAL 
3. CARNES DID NOT BREACH ANY IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING. 
A, Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith Requires Bad Faith 
Conduct. 
Brown contends (its brief at 19-23) the scope of the 
implied duty of good faith is broader than described by 
Carnes. For Brown, the implied duty of good faith can be 
violated even in the absence of a party's bad faith conduct. 
Brown cites four Utah cases in support• Those cases are wholly 
inapplicable. 
Carnes does not dispute that the implied duty of good 
faith prohibits a party to a contract from arbitrarily 
withholding its approval of the other party's performance, as 
stated in W. P. Harlin Construction Co. v. Utah State Road 
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 364, 431 P.2d 792, 793 (1967) and as 
asserted by Brown (its brief at 19-20). This principle, 
however, is inapplicable to this case. Unlike Harlin, none of 
the pertinent provisions in the sales agreement reserve the 
right of approval or acknowledgment of satisfaction in Carnes. 
The arbitrary withholding of approval is simply not an issue 
here. 
In Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982), this 
Court briefly discussed the scope of the implied duty of good 
faith. Id. at 144. In Cahoon, the appellant refused to 
execute the pertinent closing documents to consummate the sale 
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of a house. Id. at 143. Thereafter, the appellant asserted 
the appellee's non-performance (i.e., the timely sale of the 
home) as a defense. This Court held the appellant's willful 
refusal to execute the documents which rendered the appellee's 
performance impossible was the breach of the implied duty of 
good faith. Id. at 144. 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982) is similar to Cahoon. In Leigh Furniture, when the 
plaintiff became disenchanted with its contract with the 
defendant, it repeatedly harrassed the defendant over a 
significant period of time, rendering defendant's performance 
impossible. Id. at 296-301. Although defendant's counterclaim 
was not submitted on the theory of plaintiff's breach of an 
implied duty of good faith, this Court stated in dictum that 
the acts committed by the plaintiff might give rise to a breach 
of the implied duty of good faith. Id. at 306. 
Unlike Cahoon and Leigh Furniture, Carnes did nothing 
to prevent Brown's performance or make its performance more 
difficult. In fact, Carnes granted Brown a five month 
extension to enable it to obtain the specification and order of 
Carnes' equipment in the Church Office Building. Brown's 
failure to do so was not caused by Carnes' interference or its 
refusal to act. 
This Court's discussion of the implied duty of good 
faith in Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock 
Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) was addressed in an 
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entirely different context than in this case. In Weston Ranch, 
the defendant asserted, among other claims, that the consulting 
and management contract was rendered illusory by the contract's 
provision allowing Resource Management Co. (RMC) the right to 
terminate the contract at will. Id. at 1036-40. In discussing 
the illusory nature of the contract, this Court stated that an 
implied duty of good faith would prevent RMC from terminating 
the contract capriciously or in bad faith and, therefore, the 
contract was not illusory. Id. 
The illusory nature of Brown's agreement is not at 
issue here. Brown has never contended the agreement was 
illusory and unenforceable. Furthermore, Brown has never 
contended its termination by Carnes was in bad faith. Nor 
could it. The trial court specifically found the contract was 
not terminated in bad faith. 
None of Brown's cases support its broad construction 
of the implied duty of good faith. In each case, this Court 
focused upon the parties' actions to determine whether a party 
had acted in bad faith, capriciously or arbitrarily. No bad 
faith conduct was found in either Harlin or Weston Ranch (RMC's 
bad faith termination was not an issue in Weston Ranch). In 
Cahoon and Leigh Furniture, this Court held the implied duty of 
good faith had been breached. The breach in both cases, 
however, was based upon the parties' intentional bad faith 
conduct. 
A 1983 Utah case further suggests that a party must 
act in bad faith to breach an implied duty of good faith. In 
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Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 657 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1983), the plaintiff-contractor sued its insurer, 
INA, when INA denied coverage of the losses alleged by 
plaintiff. Ld. at 1327. INA filed a third-party complaint 
against Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. Structo counterclaimed 
and asserted it was plaintiff's subcontractor and as such an 
insured under INA's policy. Therefore, INA could not sue 
Structo. Id. at 1327-29. This Court agreed. Id. 
Structo further asserted it was entitled to recover 
its attorney's fees in defending the action against INA because 
INA had acted in bad faith when it filed the third-party 
complaint against Structo. Id. at 1329. In addressing 
Structo's assertion, this Court stated: "While we acknowledge 
that contracting parties owe each other the duty to deal in 
good faith . . . there is no evidence here of bad faith on the 
part of INA . . . ." Id. (citation omitted). 
Based upon Jacobsen Construction, upon the cases cited 
by Brown, and upon the cases cited by Carnes in its principal 
brief, bad faith conduct by the alleged breaching party must be 
found before the implied duty of good faith can be breached. 
The trial court made no finding of bad faith by Carnes. The 
termination of Brown and its replacement by Long-Deming was 
done in good faith. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion 
that Carnes breached an implied duty of good faith to Brown is 
incorrect. 
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B. A Condition Which Contradicts an Agreement's Clear, Express 
Provisions Will Not be Implied. 
The sales agreement is clear and unambiguous. Brown 
suggests (its brief at 17, 24) the contract must be ambiguous 
because the trial court found its provisions "only appeared to 
be somewhat clear and unambiguous." Brown, however, has not 
and could not specify any ambiguity in the pertinent 
provisions. Furthermore, the trial court made no such finding. 
The implied duty of good faith does not justify the 
trial court's implication of conditions which contradict the 
clear, express terms of the agreement. In Mann v. American 
Western Life Insurance Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978) the 
plaintiff was employed by the defendant as an insurance agent. 
Id. at 462. A written contract was executed which permitted 
either party to terminate on thirty days written notice. It 
further specified certain premiums to which plaintiff would be 
entitled even if he were terminated. Subsequently, the 
plaintiff entered into negotiations, both written and verbal, 
to improve his agency agreement. Id. Shortly after new 
management was installed, plaintiff was terminated. Id. at 
463. Plaintiff asserted three claims: (1) defendant 
terminated the contract in bad faith; (2) the written contract 
had been orally modified which increased the amount of 
commission due plaintiff; and (3) the defendant had been 
unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's expense, id. at 462. The 
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trial court directed a verdict in defendant's favor on all 
three theories, which was affirmed by this Court, Id, at 
464-65. 
In holding the defendant's termination of plaintiff 
was not in bad faith, this Court refused to imply terms which 
were inconsistent with the contract's express terms and stated: 
Mann cites substantial authority for the 
proposition that, even though a party to a contract 
may have a right to terminate it without cause, he 
must nevertheless exercise the right in good faith and 
not at a time or in a manner which inflicts 
unnecessary injury or works unconscionable injustice. 
Courts have permitted considerations of equity to 
control over clear contract language covering 
termination . . . . A variety of tort and contract 
theories have been contrived to permit recovery in 
these situations, and the "duty of good faith" theory 
which Mann advances is among them. 
Whatever the justification for judicial remaking 
of the party's contracts in these extreme cases may 
have been, it cannot be adopted as a general precept 
of contract law that, whenever one party to a contract 
can show injury flowing from the exercise of a 
contract right by the other, a basis for relief will 
be somehow devised by the courts. 
Id. at 464. (emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, two of the cases cited by Brown support 
this proposition. In Harlin, the parties entered into a 
construction contract. 431 P.2d at 792. The contract 
expressly provided for the type of pile driving equipment to be 
used and the rating at which the equipment was to operate. 
Id.at 793. Among others, the contract allowed the use of a 
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combustion-type hammer, approval of which was left to the 
defendant- The contract did not specify when the defendant 
would be required to approve use of a combustion-type hammer. 
Thus, this Court's holding that defendant could not arbitrarily 
withhold approval. The plaintiff further asserted the implied 
duty of good faith required defendant either to accept the 
manufacturer's rating of the hammer or to establish the rating 
by appropriate tests. The plaintiff argued that because 
defendant had failed to do either, it acted arbitrarily in 
withholding its approval, id. This Court rejected plaintiff's 
contention because the contract did not require such conduct by 
the defendant. Id. at 794. The Court refused to imply any 
terms through the implied duty of good faith which were not 
already expressed in the contract. Icl. Furthermore, the Court 
stated in Cahoon that the implied duty of good faith requires 
the parties to a contract to cooperate in the performance of 
the contract in accordance with its "expressed intent" 641 
P.2d at 144. 
Here, the trial court did exactly what this Court 
refused to do in Harlin and it acted contrary to this Court's 
statement in Cahoon. Using the implied duty of good faith, it 
improperly implied a term requiring Carnes to pay Brown 
commissions which were earned after Brown's termination, 
despite the clear, express terms contained in the sales 
agreement. 
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C Neither the Trial Court's Findings Nor the Underlying 
Evidence Support Its Conclusion That Carnes Breached Its 
Implied Duty of Good Faith, 
Brown paraphrases (its brief at 17-18) certain of the 
trial court's findings of fact which allegedly support its 
conclusion that Carnes breached its implied duty of good 
faith. None of those findings support the trial court's 
conclusion, however, if the implied duty of good faith is 
interpreted correctly. A breach of the implied duty of good 
faith requires bad faith conduct. None of the findings cited 
by Brown show any bad faith conduct by Carnes. Furthermore, 
the trial court specifically found Brown's termination and the 
replacement of Brown by Long-Deming were proper and not in bad 
faith. 
The evidence shows Carnes acted in good faith in all 
its dealings with Brown. Prior to Brown's termination, in 
1965, a dispute arose regarding the commission split between 
Brown and Carnes' New Mexico sales representative. Brown 
requested Carnes award all of the specificaction commission to 
it. (PI. Tr. Ex. 110.) Based upon Brown's efforts to obtain 
specification of Carnes' equipment in the Office Building, 
Carnes agreed. (PI. Tr. Ex. 106.) This adjustment assumed 
Carnes' equipment would be specified while Brown's agreement 
was still effective. 
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A second adjustment occurred in 1968 when Carnes 
terminated Brown, Carnes notified Brown it would be entitled 
to any commissions for equipment specified or ordered within 30 
days after termination of the agreement, (PI. Tr. Ex, 107.) 
In response, Brown requested Carnes reconsider the 30 day 
period allowed by the sales agreement. (PI. Tr. Ex. 108.) On 
September 10, 1968, Carnes replied and extended for five months 
the time within which Brown would be entitled to commissions. 
(PI. Tr. Ex. 103.) Brown was unable to consummate the deal 
within the additional time. 
All subsequent efforts to obtain specification and 
order of Carnes* equipment were expended by Carnes* new 
representative, Long-Deming. Thus, Long-Deming was entitled to 
the commissions earned after the additional period expired. 
All the evidence shows Carnes acted in good faith in 
all its dealings with Brown. Furthermore, as stated 
previously, there was no evidence at trial that Carnes ever 
agreed to pay Brown for any equipment specified or ordered 
after March 1, 1969. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CALCULATED THE COMMISSION BY 
RELYING ON ALLEGATIONS APPEARING IN "PLEADINGS" FILED BY 
THE PARTIES OUTSIDE OF TRIAL. 
The trial court determined the Church had purchased 
$500,000 of Carnes1 equipment for installation in the Office 
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Building. It then used that figure to compute the amount of 
the commission owing to Brown. The courts determination was 
not based on competent evidence and was wholly the result of 
speculation. 
An employee of Brown's testified that, in anticipation 
of his testimony at trial, he had attempted to calculate the 
cost of the Carnes' equipment installed in the Office Building 
and had reduced his figures to an exhibit described as a "price 
list." (PI. Tr. Ex. 111.) Carnes rightfully objected to the 
testimony and to the exhibit on numerous grounds. (See Games' 
principal brief at 28-30.) The trial court received the 
exhibit, nevertheless. It expressed its dismay about the 
strength of Brown's evidence on damages, however, and concluded 
Brown should have produced stronger evidence by subpoenaing the 
final "as built" plans possessed by the Church. The trial 
court, undaunted, then set out to determine the damages by 
itself. Those subsequent calculations by the court were 
improperly based on an allegation made in the amended complaint 
by Brown's prior counsel and on answers to interrogatories 
filed by Long-Deming. The trial court's calculation of 
damages was reversible error. (See Carnes' principal brief at 
34-39.) 
1 1
 Carnes noted in its principal brief (at 38) that answers 
to interrogatories may not be used indiscriminately at trial, 
as happened here. This Court follows this limitation, allowing 
their use only in limited circumstances, such as impeaching the 
trial testimony of the person making them. See Kusy v. K-Mart 
Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984). 
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Brown now offers a rejoinder* The price list prepared 
by its witness was proper "secondary evidence," made admissible 
by Carnes' destruction of its sales documents and by Brown's 
own inability to obtain other relevant, original documents. 
The complaint allegation and the interrogatory answers were 
used by the trial court, Brown contends, only to corroborate 
the testimony of its witness, not to try the merits of the 
action. 
Brown's reply is not pursuasive. It is not supported 
by the law or by the trial record. 
First, Brown's witness attempted to calculate the 
overall cost of the Carnes' equipment installed in the Office 
Building by manually counting the equipment he could see in a 
handful of rooms on a small number of floors in the building 
itself and then multiplying the equipment in his sample rooms 
by his estimate of the total number of rooms in the entire 
building; he then used old price lists of his own and price 
quotations given to him by suppliers of competitive equipment 
in order to compute a unit price for the Carnes' equipment. 
12 The entire process was awkward and legally objectionable. It 
would have been more proper to obtain the orignal "as built" 
plans and specifications in the custody of the Church. Brown 
never asked Carnes or Long-Deming for them, presumably because 
1 2
 Carnes objected to the testimony. See Carnes* 
principal brief at 28-30. 
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Brown knew they were in the possession of the Church itself. 
(Tr. 47-48.) Nevertheless, Brown never subpoenaed the 
documents. Shortly before the noon recess on the first day of 
trial and immediately after Brown's witness had explained his 
price list, this exchange occurred between the court and 
Brown's counsel about the plans and specifications: 
THE COURT: I assume those original plans of the 
Church are fairly readily accessible to anyone, if you 
deem them necessary to produce. 
MR. HOWELL: It is about lunch time, and I would 
return after the noon break and I'll get copies of the 
specifications. There's a couple of things in those 
that I would like to call the Court's specific 
attention to. 
(Tr. at 56.) The specifications were never produced as 
promised. Brown was willing to rely on something less. 
Second, Brown attempts to justify the testimony of its 
witness by contending Carnes destroyed relevant, original 
documents. The contention is absolutely false. There is no 
proof whatsoever that Carnes intentionally destroyed documents 
relevant to this case. Carnes has fully explained the matter 
already. (See Carnes' principal brief at 31-34.) 
Third, it is clear from reading the trial transcript 
that the trial court did not merely use the complaint 
allegation and the interrogatory answers to corroborate the 
testimony of Brown's witness. Rather, the trial court relied 
on them exclusively to establish the total cost of the 
equipment sold to the Church and installed in the Office 
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Building. It is not necessary to quibble, however. If, as 
Brown suggests, the trial court used the documents for 
corroboration, that was reversible error. They were never 
offered and received into evidence at trial, and, for that 
reason, cannot form any basis for the trial court's decision, 
be it corroboration or a decision on the merits. (See Games' 
principal brief at 34-39.) 
CONCLUSION 
Carnes properly terminated its sales agreement with 
Brown and had no continuing obligation to pay a commission 
under the specific language of the agreement. Carnes did not 
breach an implied duty of good faith. 
The trial court improperly calculated the commission 
by using naked allegations in the amended complaint and answers 
to interrogatories. Neither the rules of civil procedure nor 
the rules of evidence permit it. 
Brown is not entitled to any commission. Neither is 
it entitled to prejudgment interest. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 1986. 
JZLE>>^RftPER^. P.C 
Sid E. Lewis 
A t to rneys for Carnes 
Corpora t ion 
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